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ABSTRACT 
A flexible mandatory access control policy (MAC) for XML 
databases is presented in this paper. The label type and label 
access policy can be defined according to the requirements of 
applications. In order to preserve the integrity of data in XML 
databases, a constraint between a read access rule and a write 
access rule in label access policy is introduced. Rules for label 
assignment and propagation are proposed to alleviate the 
workload of label assignment. Also, a solution for resolving 
conflicts of label assignments is proposed. At last, operations for 
implementation of the MAC policy in a XML database are 
illustrated.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.2.0 [Database Management]:Security, integrity and protection 
General Terms 
Management, Security 
Keywords 
Database Security, XML database, Mandatory access control 
1. INTRODUCTION 
XML is widely used in a variety of applications, and has become 
a standard for describing and exchanging data across the Internet. 
As more and more XML documents are stored in XML databases, 
the security of XML databases has become an important issue. 
Access control is one of the methods used to guarantee the 
security of XML databases. Access control models for XML 
databases can be divided into two types: the discretionary access 
control model (DAC) [2] and the mandatory access control model 
(MAC) [4, 6]. In the DAC models, a subject can discretionarily 
control privileges of other subjects accessing an object in a XML 
database but attacks from a Trojan horse cannot be resisted 
because of inherent flaws.   
In the MAC model based on BLP [1], every object is assigned a 
label which specifies the security privilege of the object, and 
every user is assigned a label which specifies what objects he/she 
can access. The label in [1] is a binary-tuple L=<l, c> consisting 
of a classification l and a category c. L(s) and L(o) denote the 
labels for a subject and an object respectively, and the label L(o) ≤ 
L(s) if and only if L(o).l ≤ L(s).l and L(o).c ⊆ L(s).c. We call L(o) 
≤ L(s) as L(s) dominates L(o). In [3], when an object is accessed, 
the label of the subject is compared with the label of the object by 
the Simple security property and *-property. The MAC security 
of a system based on the BLP model is sufficient, but the rule for 
label comparing in BLP model is too rigorous for some cases. The 
larger the set of category for an object is, the fewer the users that 
can access it. In some applications [7, 8], the rule for label 
comparing is not as rigorous as this. On the contrary, the 
requirement is: the larger the set of category, the more users that 
can access it. Moreover, in these applications the structure of the 
label may be different from the structure of the label in the BLP 
model. In order to meet the needs of these applications, [5, 7, 8] 
have enhanced the flexibility of the MAC mechanism in relational 
databases. The existing MAC models [4, 6] for XML databases 
are all based on the BLP model. How to make the flexibility of 
MAC available to XML databases has not been reported in the 
literature. In order to enhance the security of XML databases for 
all-purpose uses, XML databases should provide a flexible MAC. 
This paper focuses on this problem.  
The contributions of this paper are: 
(1) A flexible MAC policy for XML databases is proposed. The 
label structure and label access policy can be defined according to 
the requirements of the applications.  
(2) A constraint between the read access rules and write 
access rules in label access policy has been introduced. The rules 
for label assignment and propagation are addressed to alleviate 
the workload of label assignments. The problem for conflicts of 
label assignments has been solved. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes 
the basic concepts. Section 3 describes the flexible MAC policy 
for XML databases in detail. Section 4 summarizes the 
conclusions. Because of the space limit, we do not illustrate our 
implementation of the policy in a XML database.  
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2. Basic Concepts 
The structure of the label in our MAC policy is that: each label is 
specified by a label type, and the label type specifies what 
components the label type consists of. Every component in a label 
is specified by a label component type. Normally, the structure of 
the label is specified by the administrator; it can be the same or 
not the same as the structure of the label in the BLP model. 
Definition 1. Label component type. The label component type 
LC is a set of elements
1 2{ , , , }mLC c c c= … , 1m ≥  and it also 
specifies whether the set is ordered or unordered. If LC is an 
ordered set, then c1 ≤ c2 ≤…≤ cm and we call it an ordered label 
component type. Otherwise, we call it an unordered label 
component type. 
Definition 2. Label component. The label component lc is an 
instance of a label component type. If LC is an ordered label 
component type then lc∈LC, otherwise lc⊆ LC. 
Example 1. We can define two label component types secret and 
Dept. The secret=LC1={unclassified, secret, Top-secret} is an 
ordered label component type with unclassified ≤ secret ≤ Top-
secret. Any element in LC1 is a label component as the 
classification of the label in the BLP model. 
Dept=LC2={Technique, HumanResource, Financial} is an 
unordered label component type. It denotes the department names 
of a company. Any subset of LC2 is a label component as the 
category of the label in the BLP model. We can define label 
component types in XML format files. 
Definition 3. Label type.  A label type is an n-tuple 
LT=<LC1 , … , LCn>, which is composed of n label component 
types. Here n≥1, LCi is a defined label component type. In order 
to prevent semantic confusion of the labels for subjects and 
objects, we specify that there is at most one ordered label 
component in a label type. If a label type has an ordered label 
component type, then we specify that LC1 must be the ordered 
label component type. 
Definition 4. Label. A label LA = <lc1 ,…, lcn> is an instance of 
a label type
1 2, ,..., nLT LC LC LC=< > . Where iLC (1 i n≤ ≤ ) is a 
defined label component type, and lci is a label component of iLC . 
Definition 5. Label access rule.  The label access rule is a four-
tuple LAS=(LA, LT, OP, type), where LA is a set of labels and LT 
is label type of LA, type∈{r, w} which indicates the rule is a read 
access rule(type=r) or a write access rule(type=w), and OP is n-
tuple OP=<op1, …, opn>. For any two labels l1, l2∈LA, each opi 
indicates the operation between l1.ci and l2.ci(1≤i≤n). For an 
ordered label component type in LT, the opi ∈{EQ, LE, GE, GT, 
LT} which denotes operators in {=, <=, >=, >, <} respectively. 
For an unordered label component type in LT, the opi ∈ {IN, 
INTERSECTION, CONTAIN, EQUAL}.  
Definition 6 label access policy The label access policy is a triple 
LP=(S, O, LASS). Where S is a set of subjects and O is a set of 
objects, and LASS is a set of label access rules. The LASS consists 
of a read access rule and a write access rule. 
LP indicates when a subject s∈ S reads an object o∈  O, the 
labels for the subject and the object must conform to the read 
access rule. The labels for the subject and the object are compared 
according to the operations specified in LP.LASS.OP to determine 
whether the subject can read the object or not. In the following 
discussion, if a label L(s) and a label L(o) conform to a read 
access rule in LP.LASS, it is denoted as L(s)ωr in LP.LASS L(o). If a 
label L(s) and a label L(o) conform to a write access rule in 
LP.LASS, it is denoted as L(s)ωw in LP.LASS L(o). 
For a label access policy, we can define label access rules in 
XML format. The format of a rule for specifying an operator 
between two components in the labels of a subject and an object 
in XML is: 
Subject.component-name <operator> Object.component-name. 
The MAC policy compares the labels of a subject and an object 
according to the label access rules. Our policy supports the 
INTERSECTION operator when we compare two labels; this is 
different from the other models [4, 6] for XML databases. 
However, when the operator INTERSECTION appears in the read 
access rule, the domination relationship between two labels 
cannot be well defined as that in BLP model. So we did not define 
domination relationship between two labels in our policy.  
3. Flexible Mandatory Access Control Policy 
When a subject tries to access an object, the read access rule is 
applied to evaluate whether the labels of a subject and an object 
are matched. If they are matched, the user can read the object. 
When a subject tries to insert an object into a XML document, or 
tries to update or delete an object from a XML document, the read 
access rule must be evaluated first to locate the object to be 
inserted or updated or deleted. In our flexible MAC policy any 
user can read what he/she wrote. Otherwise, the integrity of data 
is not maintained. We have the following constraint.  
Rule 1. The constraint of label access policy. For a label access 
policy LP=(S, O, LASS), the write access rule contains the read 
access rule. Namely, for any subject s∈S, and any object o∈O, 
the privilege of L(s) ωw in LP.LASS L(o) is higher than  L(s) ωr in 
LP.LASS L(o). 
3.1 The labeled subjects and XML documents 
The subjects of our MAC policy are the users who access the 
XML databases or application programs or agents on behalf of 
users. The administrator creates label types and labels, and 
assigns them to users. Every user except the administrator has a 
unique label.  
The objects are elements/attributes in XML documents and 
schemas. We denote the objects in XML documents with 
XPath[3]. As the labeled schema and its XML documents have 
the same notations, we formally define the labeled XML 
document in definition 7. The same principle can be applied for 
formally defining XML schema. 
Definition 7 Labeled XML document. The XML document 
XDoc with labels is an eleven-tuple XDoc=(Ve, vr, Va, Ns, Ls, LT, 
LP, elemR, attrR, nameR, labelR). We have:  
(1) Ve is the set of all elements in the document; 
(2) vr is the root of the document, vr is also an element of in the 
document, vr∈Ve; 
(3) Va is the set of all attributes in the document; 
(4) Ns is the set of name, including the name of elements and 
attributes; 
(5) elemR is a binary-tuple, elemR⊆ Ve×Ve. If e1∈Ve, e2∈Ve, 
then (e1, e2) ∈elemR denotes e2 is a sub-element of e1 or there 
exists a link in e1 associated with e2; 
(6) attrR is a binary-tuple, attrR⊆ Ve×Va. If e∈Ve, a∈Va then 
(e, a) ∈  attrR denotes a is an attribute of e; 
(7) nameR is a binary-tuple, nameR⊆ Ns× (VaU Ve). If n∈Ns, 
v∈VaU ∈Ve, then (v, n)∈nameR denotes that n is the name of 
v. As different elements or attributes in the same document may 
have the same names, one member of Ns may be mapped into a 
different member of VaU Ve; 
(8) Ls is the set of all labels with a label type LT; 
(9) LT is the label type which specifies the structure of the labels 
in the document; 
(10) LP is the label access policy, and LP determines the set of 
label access rules including a read access rule and a write access 
rule; 
(11) labelR is a binary-tuple, labelR ⊆ (VaU Ve)×Ls. If L∈Ls, 
v∈  VaU Ve, then (v, L) ∈ labelR denotes L is the label of v, or 
L=L(v). Different elements or attributes may have the same label, 
and every element or attribute has only one label.  
For the document not being labeled, it is a seven-tuple Doc= (Ve, 
vr, Va, Ns, elemR, attrR, nameR). The meanings of these symbols 
are the same as those in the XDoc. In the following discussion, we 
use XDoc and XSch to denote a labeled XML document and 
schema respectively. And from the definition of XDoc, we have: 
for any label access rule las∈XDoc.LP.LASS, XDoc.LT=las.LT. 
3.2 Label assignment rules for XML objects 
Multiple label access policies can be defined for different security 
requirements but every document can only be assigned one label 
access policy. After a XML document or schema is loaded, we 
should first assign label access policy for them. Then, labels for 
elements or attributes in XML documents and schema are 
assigned. 
3.2.1 The constraint of label access policy between 
XML schema and documents 
A XML schema defines a set of XML documents with the same 
structure and similar content. The label access policy should be 
the same for the schema and its documents. 
Rule 2. The constraint of label access policy between XML 
schema and document. If the labeled XML schema and its 
document are XSch and XDoc respectively, then 
XSch.LP=XDoc.LP. 
3.2.2 The rules for label assignment and propagation 
When a XML schema is created, the label for the root of the 
schema should be assigned. For an ordinary user, when he/she 
creates a XML schema, the label for the root of the schema is 
equal to the label of the user. We have the following Rule 3.  
Rule 3. The label for the root of XML schema. For an ordinary 
subject s, if s creates a XML schema sch, then L(sch.vr)=L(s).  
If the schema is created by the administrator, the label must be 
assigned explicitly. There are a large number of elements and 
attributes in a XML document. If each element or attribute is 
assigned a label, the workload for management of these labels is 
high. We can make use of the features of XML to alleviate the 
administrator’s workload.  
The administrator only needs to assign labels to XML schemas 
and some elements in XML documents. Then, the labels are 
propagated to the instances of the elements or attributes in XML 
documents of the schema, or the labels are propagated to 
descendent elements and attributes of the labeled elements 
downward from root to leaves in XML documents.  
Rule 4. The label propagation from XML schema to XML 
documents. For labeled XDoc and XSch, an instance object 
io ∈ XDoc.Va U XDoc.Ve, and a schema object 
so∈XSch.VaU XSch.Ve, assume io is one of the instances of the 
schema object so, then L(io)=L(so).  
Rule 5. The label propagation from an element to its sub-
elements and attributes. Assume XDoc is a labeled XML 
document, for any element e1, e2∈Ve (or attribute a1∈Va), if 
(e1, e2)∈  elemR (or (e1, a1)∈  attrR), then L(e2)=L(e1)(or 
L(a1)=L(e1). 
3.2.3 The solution for conflictions of label 
assignments 
Rule 4 and Rule 5 enhance the flexibility of label assignment and 
alleviate the workload of the administrator, but may cause 
assignments of several different labels to one object. For example, 
an element in a XML document may have three labels. One is 
propagated from its ancestor, one is propagated from the schema, 
and the last one is assigned directly by the administrator. In order 
to guarantee that every object in a XML document has only one 
label, we introduce a rule for solving label assignment conflicts. 
Rule 6. The label calculation rule. Assume a read access rule 
lasr=(L, LT, OP), L1 =<a1, a2, …, an>∈L and L2 =< b1, b2, …, 
bn >∈L are two labels of label type LT, if L1 and L2 are two 
labels assigned to the same object by direct assignment or by 
propagation respectively, we can calculate a new label L3=<c1, 
c2, …, cn> for the object, where each component of L3 is 
calculated as follows: 
(1) For the ordered label components type in the LT, if the 
operator in the lasr.OP.opi is: 
(i) GE or GT, then L3.c1=max(L1.a1, L2.b1); 
(ii) LE or LT, then L3.c1=min(L1.a1, L2.b1); 
(iii)EQ, then L3.c1=max(L1.a1, L2.b1); 
Here the max(l1, l2) is a function to calculate the maximum of l1 
and l2, min(l1, l2) is a function to calculate the minimum of l1 and 
l2. 
(2)In the following formulas, if there is an ordered label 
component type in the label type then i≥2, otherwise i≥1. For the 
unordered label components type in LT, if the operator 
lasr.OP.opi is: 
(i) IN, then L3.ci = L1.ci ∩ L2.ci; 
(ii) CONTAIN, then L3.ci = L1.ci ∪ L2.ci; 
(iii) INTERSECTION, then L3.ci = L1.ci ∩ L2.ci; 
(iv) EQUAL, then L3.ci = L1.ci. 
Rule 6 can be extended to calculate a unique label for an object 
which is assigned three labels due to direct assignment or 
propagation. Because the least upper bound does not exist for 
INTERSECTION operator in the sense of the least upper bound 
defined for CONTAIN operator in [4], a simple calculation rule 
for INTERSECTION operator is used in Rule 6. Namely, when 
INTERSECTION operator is specified for some component in a 
label access policy, we specify that the component of the result 
labels is the intersection of corresponding components of two 
labels. The case may occur in which some object cannot be 
accessed by any users except the administrator or the creator of 
the XML document which the object belongs to. Although we 
lose some availability, the secret is kept.  We use a function 
label_comput(L1, L2) to denote the result from Rule 6 where L1, L2 
are two labels. 
3.2.4 Operations for implementation of the MAC 
policy in a XML database 
We implemented our flexible MAC access control policy in a 
XML database management system. As for the space limit, we do 
not illustrate the architecture of the system and experiments for 
performance comparison. We only discuss the operations for 
implementation of the MAC policy.  
The query operations deal with read-only operations. When a user 
submits a query request, the system parses the query request and 
searches the label access rules. Then, the query is rewritten 
according to the label of the user and label access rules, and then 
the rewritten query is executed. By this way, we can prevent users 
from inference inferring unauthorized data.  
The update operations may impact on the labels or structure of 
XML documents. When a subject loads a XML document, the 
label of the subject is compared with the label of the root of the 
schema corresponding to the XML document. If they conform to 
the write access rule in the label access policy, the XML 
document is loaded and the label of the root is calculated from the 
label of the subject and the label of the root of the schema of the 
loaded XML documents by Rule 6.  
When a subject modifies the objects or deletes some objects in a 
XML document, the label of subject may not be equal to the label 
of the objects. If the update operation would change some other 
user's access privileges covertly, this would cause security 
problems such as covert information transmission. We permit the 
updating operation success only when the label of subject and the 
label of the objects conform to the write access rule in the label 
access policy.  
For insertion operation, we should first find the object o1 which is 
the parent of the object o2 to be inserted. According to Rule 4 and 
Rule 5, the inserted object o2 may have two labels propagated 
from its ancestor and schema respectively. We should calculate 
L(o2) from Rule 6 and then compare the label of user with L(o2). If 
the label of user and L(o2) satisfy the write access rule in the label 
access policy, the insert operation is permitted.  
4. Conclusion 
Providing a flexible mandatory access control policy for XML 
databases is important for many applications. We have proposed 
an approach which can provide MAC policies for different 
purposes with different requirements, including multilevel secure 
XML database systems. In our MAC policy, label access policies 
can be defined according to the requirements of various 
applications, which can enhance the flexibility of MAC policy in 
general. A constraint between the access control rules for a read 
access rule and a write access rule is proposed to maintain the 
integrity of data. Rules for label assignment and propagation are 
proposed to alleviate the workload of label assignments, and a 
rule for solving label assignment conflicts is also proposed. 
Moreover, operations for implementation of the MAC policy in 
the XML database are discussed. The MAC policy in this paper 
can be regarded as a generalization of the BLP model. 
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